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On May 3 and 4, 2006, the Payment Cards Center hosted a two-day conference, “The Role of Electronic 
Payments in Disaster Recovery: Providing More Than Convenience,” that brought together participants 
from financial institutions and other payment providers, federal and state government and national 
relief agencies, and the bank regulatory community. Participants examined the lessons learned from 
Hurricane Katrina and considered how these experiences may be useful in identifying opportunities to 
further strengthen the resiliency of our financial system. In the course of the discussion, participants 
made recommendations, including developing strategies for more government payments to be made 
electronically, consolidating and sharing data on disaster victims more broadly with relief agencies and 
payment providers, focusing local communities and state governments on developing contingency 
plans for payment continuity, and improving public- and private-sector coordination among entities 
that play key roles in the payment system.TABLE OF 
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I. Introduction
  On May 3 and 4, 2006, the Payment Cards 
Center hosted a conference titled “The Role of Elec-
tronic Payments in Disaster Recovery: Providing More 
Than Convenience.”1 The event brought together a 
range of groups, including financial institutions and 
other payment providers, federal and state government 
and national relief agencies, and the bank regulatory 
community. 2 Participants examined these organiza-
tions’ experiences in responding to Hurricane Katrina 
and considered how the lessons learned might be ap-
plied when developing strategies to further strengthen 
the resiliency of our financial system. 
  Jack Guynn, president of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta, gave the keynote address.3 Geo-
graphically, the Atlanta Fed manages the Sixth Dis-
trict, which includes operations in Georgia, Florida, 
and Tennessee, as well as in the states most directly 
affected by Hurricane Katrina: Louisiana, Mississippi, 
and Alabama. On a personal note, Guynn also spent 
many years living in the Gulf Coast region while work-
ing in the Atlanta Fed’s New Orleans branch office. As 
a result, Guynn’s view of the challenges associated with 
the destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina and the 
success stories that emerged came from the perspective 
not only of the president of the Reserve Bank leading 
the local response but also of someone with personal 
ties to the region.
  The following day, Sandra Braunstein, direc-
tor of the division of Consumer & Community Affairs 
(C&CA) of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, opened the conference by welcom-
ing conference participants. She thanked them for 
gathering at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
to share their experiences and to consider how they 
may be applied in strengthening contingency plans and 
disaster response strategies. She emphasized that the 
conference represented an opportunity to learn from 
the individual experiences and diverse perspectives of 
the broad set of stakeholders gathered for this discus-
sion. 
  The conference was motivated in part by the 
research of Julia S. Cheney, of the Payment Cards 
Center of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 
and Sherrie L.W. Rhine, of the Office of Regional 
and Community Affairs of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York. Their paper, “How Effective Were the 
Financial Safety Nets in the Aftermath of Katrina?,” 
described the financial system’s response to Hurricane 
Katrina, examined the unique vulnerabilities of un-
banked consumers in a disaster situation, and consid-
ered the role of electronic payments, specifically the 
use of prepaid and electronic benefits transfer (EBT) 
cards, to provide liquidity and access to financial ser-
vices, particularly for the most vulnerable victims. The 
subsequent conference discussion confirmed two key 
conclusions reached by the authors: electronic pay-
ments provide far more important benefits than simple 
consumer convenience in a disaster and coordination 
among the public and private sectors is critical to 
strengthening the financial sector’s contingency plan-
ning and response to disasters. 
Cheney and Rhine presented their research as 
a way to set the stage for the remaining sessions, which 
were organized around two primary panel discussions. 
The first panel, “Electronic Payment Applications as 
Tools for Delivering Financial Relief: Are Prepaid and 
Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) Cards the Way of 
the Future?,” focused on developing a better under-
standing of the challenges faced by payment card is-
suers, transaction processors, payment networks, and 
government agencies in responding to Hurricane Ka-
trina. As these organizations worked to maintain the 
flow of payments and provide access to liquidity, panel-
ists agreed that electronic fund transfers (EFTs) proved 
to be more efficient in terms of the timing, delivery, 
and continuity of payments than paper-based alterna-
tives. While these efficiencies exist in normal circum-
stances, panelists noted that they became increasingly 
valuable when damage to infrastructure disrupted mail 
delivery. Panelists pointed to newer card-based pay-
ment applications, such as prepaid and EBT cards, as 
offering unique potential as an effective mechanism for 
delivering financial relief and other critical revenue, 
1 For the conference agenda, see Exhibit 1, page 23.
2 For a list of the organizations represented at the conference, see 
Exhibit 2, page 24.
3 Jack Guynn joined the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in 1964 
and has held a variety of assignments, including responsibility for 
payment operations, bank supervision, lending, human resources, 
and other support functions. In 1984 Guynn was named first vice 
president and chief operating officer, and in 1996, he became the 
13th president and chief executive officer of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta. Guynn recently announced his plans to retire 
effective October 1, 2006. For more information on his 42-year 
career with the Federal Reserve, see the Federal Reserve Bank of 
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particularly for those disaster victims who were un-
banked and therefore less apt to benefit from EFTs. 
  To introduce the second panel, which focused 
on how to apply the lessons learned from Hurricane 
Katrina in the future, Rear Admiral James B. Plehal 
(USN, Ret.), of the Department of Homeland Security, 
described his experiences with public- and private-
sector programs, focusing on Hurricane Katrina. As 
he noted, the sophistication of our payment networks 
makes it critically important that planning for payment 
system continuity include an examination not only of 
company-centered contingency plans but also of the 
broader roles organizations and their areas of exper-
tise play in facilitating payments. In the end, Plehal 
emphasized that bringing together the right people 
and the right organizations will lead to more efficient 
mechanisms to deliver financial relief quickly to those 
in need.
  The second panel session, “Lessons Learned 
from Hurricane Katrina and Looking Toward the Fu-
ture,” convened representatives from the public and 
private sectors whose organizations played instrumen-
tal roles in delivering critical payments and financial 
relief to Hurricane Katrina victims. Panelists consid-
ered how to apply the many lessons described in the 
earlier sessions to strategies for further strengthening 
the financial system’s responses to manmade, natural, 
or pandemic events. As a result of this discussion, par-
ticipants advanced recommendations, including devel-
oping strategies for more government payments to be 
made electronically, consolidating and sharing data on 
disaster victims more broadly with relief agencies and 
payment providers, focusing local communities and 
state governments on developing contingency plans 
for payment continuity, and improving public- and pri-
vate-sector coordination among entities that play key 
roles in the payment system.
  This summary of the conference proceedings 
follows the order set forth in the conference agenda 
(see Exhibit 1). The experiences and lessons learned 
as described by each speaker are highlighted as well as 
comments from conference participants who recom-
mended specific strategies to improve contingency 
planning and disaster recovery. 
II. Keynote Address
  Jack Guynn, president of the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Atlanta,4 opened the conference with a 
keynote address titled “Assessing and Responding to 
Hurricane Katrina: One Reserve Bank’s Perspective,” 
in which he shared insights gained from his experi-
ence leading the Reserve Bank most directly affected 
by the storm. Guynn spoke of actions taken by the 
Federal Reserve and by local bankers and others in the 
financial services industry to help Hurricane Katrina 
victims meet their emergency financial needs. Guynn’s 
perspective was grounded in his personal experience as 
a long-time resident of the Gulf Coast region. 
  As Guynn recounted, Hurricane Katrina 
struck the Gulf Coast on August 29, 200, causing sig-
nificant devastation in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Ala-
bama. The storm resulted in widespread destruction in 
New Orleans, where storm waters breached the levee 
system and flooded much of the city. The storm surge 
was estimated to be 28 to 30 feet, with winds reach-
ing 12 miles an hour. In Mississippi, Guynn noted 
that buildings were flattened more than seven miles 
inland from the Gulf Coast. Insurers have estimated 
that hurricane-related losses reached $100 billion, and 
tragically, 1,60 people lost their lives (by current esti-
mates). 
  In the midst of this devastation, Guynn de-
scribed the extraordinary efforts of local citizens to 
help their neighbors and of bankers working together 
to meet residents’ financial services needs. Several 
of these “silent heroes,” including Atlanta Fed staff, 
are highlighted in the Bank’s 200 annual report as 
examples of the courage and dedication of ordinary 
people when faced with extraordinary events. Dur-
ing the course of the conference, participants shared 
similar stories as examples of special efforts made by 
individuals in the financial industry and the regulatory 
community to maintain and restore financial services 
in the wake of this catastrophic event.
  Guynn framed his remarks describing the ex-
periences and lessons learned responding to Hurricane 
Katrina in two broad areas: people issues and banking 
and payments issues. With regard to people issues, 
Guynn observed that establishing contact with area 
employees was a first-order priority for most businesses, 
4 As one of 12 Reserve Banks, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 
operates six facilities in the Sixth Federal Reserve District, includ-
ing branch offices in New Orleans, LA; Birmingham, AL; Jackson-
ville, FL; Miami, FL; and, Nashville, TN.
 www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/weather/july-dec0/katrina/
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including the Atlanta Fed. Eventually, the Bank made 
contact with all 179 Federal Reserve employees in the 
New Orleans branch; most were reached within a few 
days. However, there were several employees who, for 
a myriad of reasons, took longer to locate. This experi-
ence highlighted the challenges faced by area employ-
ers attempting to contact their employees. These chal-
lenges stemmed from the combination of an extensive 
failure in the affected area’s communication system 
and the widespread evacuation of residents. These dif-
ficulties were particularly evident when employees had 
provided emergency contact numbers only within the 
disaster zone, and many of these emergency numbers 
were affected by localized disruptions to telephone and 
cellular service. 
  Guynn suggested that to address this problem, 
businesses should require employees to provide at least 
one emergency contact number, outside their local 
community. In addition, as was done by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, employers should consider 
maintaining a phone number, preferably toll free, from 
a remote location as a secondary point of contact for 
evacuated employees.6 Guynn emphasized that well-
designed emergency contact plans can help firms 
quickly reestablish communications with employees 
to assist with staff emergency needs as well as helping 
businesses reorganize their workforce to meet opera-
tional demands in the wake of a catastrophe.
  Turning to banking and payments issues, 
Guynn stressed the critical role played by the Federal 
Reserve System7 in ensuring adequate liquidity and 
maintaining the flow of payments in this emergency. 
He also noted the important contributions that those 
in the local banking community made to these efforts. 
Guynn addressed two particular activities of the Fed-
eral Reserve during this disaster: meeting an increased 
demand for cash and maintaining check services. 
In closing, Guynn specifically considered the role of 
electronic payments in disaster recovery, sharing his 
thoughts on the advantages electronic payments can 
offer to disaster recovery efforts.
  To set a context for his remarks, Guynn began 
by stressing the importance of insights gained from 
preparing for events such as Y2K and responding to 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Lessons 
learned from these experiences were incorporated into 
the Federal Reserve’s efforts to update and further 
strengthen its contingency and disaster recovery plans. 
As a result, when Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf 
Coast, the Federal Reserve had established an effec-
tive communications plan with its banking customers, 
positioned strategic inventory locations (SILs)8 to assist 
with cash services needs in disasters, and developed a 
system of “buddy banks” in which alternative Reserve 
Banks are designated as secondary service centers that 
can be called on in a crisis. Guynn noted that each of 
these contingency actions was activated in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina and helped to quickly restore access 
to financial services for Gulf Coast residents and busi-
nesses. 
  Considering the Hurricane Katrina experi-
ence specifically, Guynn noted that Katrina’s victims 
had an urgent need for cash to pay for necessities such 
as food, water, and shelter. The increased demand for 
cash is typical in most disasters where damage to infra-
structure and the resulting lack of electricity limit the 
immediate usefulness of electronic means of payment, 
such as credit cards, debit cards, prepaid cards, and 
electronic benefit transfer cards. Indeed, cash requests 
from Gulf Coast banks doubled in the first five days 
after the storm. In response, the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Atlanta’s cash services offices — including the New 
Orleans branch’s cash services office, which had been 
relocated to Birmingham, Alabama, in advance of the 
storm — activated contingency plans and remained 
open 24 hours a day, seven days a week, dispensing $70 
billion over Labor Day weekend alone.9 Several other 
Federal Reserve “buddy banks” contributed to efforts 
by moving currency to the affected region. In addi-
tion, with the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s New 
Orleans branch inaccessible, a Reserve Bank SIL in 
Louisiana was called on to serve as a currency distribu-
tion center situated closer to the hurricane zone. Even 
6 The Atlanta Fed’s number was not toll free at the time; it is today.
7 The term Federal Reserve System includes the Board of Gover-
nors and the 12 Reserve Banks.
8 The Federal Reserve Board of Governors established strategic 
inventory locations (SILs) by contracting with depository institu-
tions and armored carriers to hold and deliver cash from locations 
remote to Reserve Banks as a precaution against increased de-
mands for cash in expectation of Y2K or, more recently, to respond 
to potential emergency cash needs. For more detail, see www.
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/annual99/ann99.pdf.
9 The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s cash services office covers 
those services provided by its branch offices, specifically in this 
case the Birmingham, Alabama, office. Additionally, other Reserve 
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though the New Orleans branch did not flood, cash 
operations were not moved back to the branch until 
over a month after the storm hit because most basic 
services were not immediately available. Therefore, 
these contingency processes remained in place for an 
extended period. 
  Guynn shared the story of one community 
bank’s efforts in helping to meet the cash needs of local 
citizens. The First Bancshares and The First, located 
about 100 miles inland from the Gulf Coast, in Hat-
tiesburg, Mississippi, was along a route many used to 
evacuate the disaster region. In the days immediately 
following the storm, this community bank cashed near-
ly $00,000 in checks for customers and noncustomers, 
despite the potential risk of check fraud.10 To the sur-
prise of some, total fraud losses associated with these 
check transactions were only $300, no worse than on 
any average banking day. Interestingly, Guynn noted 
that following Hurricane Katrina, the bank experi-
enced a 20 percent increase in deposits and many new 
accounts, potentially reflecting the effect this goodwill 
gesture had on the general public.11 
  Guynn’s discussion highlighted the importance 
of well-designed and well-executed contingency plans 
that, in the case of Hurricane Katrina, allowed the 
Federal Reserve to quickly and efficiently respond to 
the liquidity needs of those in the affected region. His 
remarks also brought to light the important contribu-
tions that local bankers can make in helping to meet 
their communities’ emergency financial needs.
  In addition to ensuring adequate cash liquidity, 
the Federal Reserve was similarly faced with maintain-
ing check processing in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina. In New Orleans, the Federal Reserve branch 
typically processes over 1 million checks a day. With 
this branch and the local check clearinghouses inoper-
able, the Atlanta Fed saw its check processing volumes 
increase roughly 2 percent, to more than  million 
items a day. Again, contingency planning and the dedi-
cated efforts of many people contributed to the Atlanta 
Fed’s ability to absorb the increased check volume and 
maintain the continued flow of payments. 
  In examining the important role played by 
electronic payments in disaster recovery, Guynn relat-
ed in poignant detail stories of the elderly who refused 
to leave storm-flooded areas while futilely waiting for 
Social Security checks to arrive in the mail. Those who 
received such critical income through an electronic 
fund transfer payment were spared such concerns. At 
the same time, the lack of electricity and computer 
system connectivity meant that some area banks could 
not receive payments through the automated clear-
inghouse (ACH) system.12 Guynn highlighted the way 
local banks addressed this problem as another success 
story from the Hurricane Katrina experience. Financial 
institutions that could receive ACH payment instruc-
tions accepted electronic data transmissions on behalf 
of those institutions, often competitors, that could not 
accept such transmissions. Then, the institutions that 
received the ACH transmission passed on account-
level payment data to the affected institutions. By 
working together, the local banking industry helped to 
deliver minimally interrupted access to payroll, Social 
Security, and other critical revenue for disaster-area 
residents in the immediate aftermath of the storm. 
This case underscored the incremental value gained 
through coordination within the financial services and 
banking industries that, in the end, helped all banks 
better serve their customers’ financial needs following 
Hurricane Katrina. 
  In closing, Guynn acknowledged that a major 
disaster like Hurricane Katrina obviously results in 
great personal and economic losses. At the same time, 
great heroes emerge. Sadly, no one knows what New 
Orleans will look like in the future, but Guynn ex-
pressed a view that the efforts he observed by so many 
“silent heroes” gives him confidence that the city will 
emerge from this disaster. Guynn closed by noting that 
the financial community learned several lasting lessons 
from this experience:
The value of having well-planned, well-docu- •
10 Check fraud occurs when the bank accepting the check is unable 
to collect funds from the bank on which the check is drawn for 
reasons such as the check was stolen or a valid check was altered to 
show an amount greater than the payor intended.
11 The experiences of The First Bancshares and The First are 
described in more detail in the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 
200 annual report, p. 13.
12 The automated clearinghouse (ACH) is a system that processes 
electronically originated batches of debit and credit transfers. 
ACH transfers may be used to execute payroll, Social Security, 
and other benefits payments. Collectively, the Federal Reserve 
Banks are the nation’s largest ACH operator. The only pri-
vate-sector operator, the Electronic Payments Network (EPN), 
processes the balance of ACH transfers. For more information, see 
www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedach/default.htm.Role of Electronic Payments in Disaster Recovery - 9 www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc
mented, and well-communicated contingency 
plans;
The benefits that can be achieved by coordi-
nating response among private-sector finan-
cial institutions; and
The importance of close collaboration be-
tween the private and public sectors. 
  President Guynn’s remarks helped set an effec-
tive framework for the conference and provided a set 
of themes that were reflected in many of the ensuing 
discussions.
III. Conference Sessions
a. Welcome and Setting the Stage
  The next day, Sandra Braunstein, the direc-
tor of the division of Consumer & Community Affairs 
(C&CA) of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, welcomed conference participants and 
asked them, as part of the day’s discussions, to examine 
their practical experiences in responding to Hurricane 
Katrina. By sharing these observations, participants 
could offer insights into ways to further strengthen 
our nation’s financial system. This shared dialogue, 
Braunstein argued, may also help to identify actions 
that can lead to quicker and more efficient ways to 
bring financial relief to disaster victims and, in the 
end, speed the return to normalcy in regional financial 
markets following a catastrophic event. Braunstein em-
phasized that the scope of this dialogue — considering 
the broader roles of electronic payments in disaster re-
covery — is important to the Federal Reserve System’s 
responsibility to ensure continued functioning of the 
economy during a national crisis. It is also a topic 
keenly relevant to the mission of the C&CA division 
and its efforts to support consumer confidence in the 
financial products and services available to them. 
  Echoing Guynn’s keynote remarks, Braunstein 
described the damage Hurricane Katrina caused to the 
physical infrastructure and that of electronic payment 
systems as incomparable with the havoc caused by pre-
vious disasters. Despite the challenges presented by the 
immensity of the destruction, Braunstein noted that 
using newer electronic prepaid payment applications to 
deliver financial relief was a significant development. 
Indeed, two types of prepaid cards were employed: 
branded prepaid cards,13 hereafter called just prepaid 
cards, and electronic benefit transfer (EBT) cards. The 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and 
•
•
the American Red Cross, as well as some other nation-
al relief agencies, offered prepaid cards. State govern-
ments used EBT cards to deliver financial relief to their 
constituencies. 
  Braunstein briefly described the prepaid card 
model as a card-based payment application where 
value is “loaded” or associated with the prepaid card 
account. For example, the American Red Cross dis-
tributed prepaid cards branded with the MasterCard 
payment network. The prepaid cards were loaded with 
values ranging from $360 to $1,6, and cardholders 
could subsequently use the cards to purchase goods 
and services at merchant locations that accepted the 
MasterCard brand or to withdraw cash at ATMs in 
networks participating in the program.  
Braunstein emphasized that because card-
holders are limited to the value loaded on the prepaid 
cards, these cards are especially valuable to unbanked14 
and low- and moderate-income1 consumers who may 
not qualify for traditional banking products such as 
credit cards or deposit accounts. On the other hand, 
these consumer segments may be less familiar with tra-
ditional electronic payment instruments and the con-
sumer protections they afford. Braunstein noted that 
one lesson learned from Hurricane Katrina was that 
prepaid cards turned out to be a particularly useful way 
to distribute financial relief, particularly to low- and 
moderate-income consumers. (This was discussed in 
more detail in the next session.) Braunstein observed 
that educating consumers about these products is an 
important consideration for financial educators in their 
efforts to help better prepare all U.S. citizens for a cata-
strophic event. 
  In addition to financial education, the Federal 
Reserve Board’s C&CA division is also responsible for 
developing legislatively mandated consumer protec-
tion regulation. As this responsibility relates to prepaid 
cards, Braunstein emphasized that the nature of the 
13 Branded prepaid cards are branded by a payment network: Mas-
terCard, Visa, American Express, or Discover. These prepaid cards 
are generally accepted at retail and ATM locations that accept the 
network brand on the card.
14 The term unbanked refers to individuals who do not have a 
deposit or savings account.
1 To be characterized as low income, a family must have income 
less than 0 percent of the median family income for the metropoli-
tan area. Similarly, family income greater than 0 percent but less 
than 80 percent of the median family income for the area is defined 
as moderate income.10 - Role of Electronic Payments in Disaster Recovery www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc
prepaid card market presents its own set of challenges 
for bank regulators. These cards represent a new and 
still evolving form of payment with much variation 
across programs in terms of card functionality, prod-
uct pricing, and consumer acceptance. Moreover, for 
many consumers, the prepaid card market remains a 
relatively new product compared with their familiarity 
with traditional debit and credit cards.16 In the absence 
of a more settled prepaid card market, Braunstein 
stressed that “the regulatory community walks a thin 
line between continuing to encourage innovation, par-
ticularly with regard to promising new payment tools 
such as disaster relief cards, and ensuring that consum-
ers have the information they need to understand how 
these products function and the risks associated with 
their use.” She emphasized that regulations governing 
prepaid cards are still evolving, but she noted that the 
C&CA division and the Board of Governors are com-
mitted to developing regulations that meet the needs 
of both consumers and card issuers but doing so in a 
way that continues to support development and inno-
vation. 
  Braunstein noted that the C&CA division 
has a particular opportunity to leverage the Hurricane 
Katrina experience to demonstrate and reinforce the 
benefits provided by electronic payments to individu-
als, including the 20 million unbanked consumers in 
the United States who may not yet be comfortable 
with electronic-based payment products such as pre-
paid cards. Indeed, prepaid cards and electronic benefit 
transfer cards seemed to work well in providing finan-
cial relief when disaster victims had a relatively good 
understanding of:
1. The way prepaid cards function; and 
2. The consumer protections they afford. 
Ultimately, Braunstein’s vision is to leverage the com-
munity development experience in the C&CA division 
and the constructive example of Hurricane Katrina 
to focus on efforts to provide financial education for 
consumers who may be unbanked so that they better 
understand the benefits of participating in the financial 
mainstream and the benefits associated with electronic 
payments. She emphasized that, as discussed further in 
the next presentation, adopting more efficient, and of-
ten electronic, forms of payment presents an opportu-
nity to more quickly deliver financial services and relief 
to victims following a catastrophic event.   
  Braunstein closed by thanking participants for 
their dedication to helping those citizens devastated 
by Hurricane Katrina. She recognized that the group 
gathered in the room had an intimate knowledge of 
the specific challenges Hurricane Katrina imposed on 
business functions supporting the financial system. Fi-
nally, she challenged participants to look back on their 
experiences and find areas where improvements might 
be made or things done differently to reach a better 
result in the future. 
b. Hurricane Katrina: A Case Study
  The conference was motivated in part by a 
recent Payment Cards Center discussion paper titled 
“How Effective Were the Financial Safety Nets in 
the Aftermath of Katrina,?” co-authored by Julia S. 
Cheney and Sherrie L.W. Rhine.17 The authors pre-
sented their research findings to set the stage for the 
two panel sessions that followed.
  As outlined by Rhine, the paper’s four primary 
objectives were to describe the U.S. financial system’s 
response to the destruction caused by Hurricane 
Katrina, examine how these and other relief efforts 
helped meet consumers’ needs in the aftermath of the 
storm, highlight the increased importance played by 
electronic payments in providing liquidity and restor-
ing financial services, and present areas for further 
study that might lead to new strategies to further 
safeguard the U.S. population and the financial system 
against future catastrophic events. 
  In describing the steps taken by the Federal 
Reserve and other federal bank, thrift, and credit 
union regulatory agencies and by the private-sector fi-
nancial services industry in meeting the financial needs 
of Hurricane Katrina’s victims, she and Julia Cheney 
in their paper, Rhine noted, made several of the same 
observations made by President Guynn the previous 
16 Mercator Advisory Services estimated total volume processed on 
prepaid cards in 2004 to be $160 billion, whereas the total purchase 
volume on MasterCard and Visa credit and debit cards was over 
$1. trillion, according to The Nilson Report.
17 “How Effective Were the Financial Safety Nets in the Aftermath 
of Katrina?” is available on the Payment Cards Center’s website at 
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc/HurricaneKatrinaJan06.pdf. 
Julia S. Cheney is an industry specialist with the Payment Cards 
Center at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, and Sherrie 
L.W. Rhine is a senior economist with the Office of Regional and 
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evening. A key observation of both the authors and 
Guynn was the relevance of learning from past events 
to strengthen contingency planning. In the case of 
Hurricane Katrina, the Federal Reserve was able to 
effectively move cash to the affected areas, provide 
check clearing services from alternative locations, and 
make available emergency lending through the dis-
count window18 because of effective contingency plan-
ning. Additionally, financial institutions and payment 
networks had plans in place that allowed for clearing 
and settlement operations to be conducted from alter-
native locations, outside the immediate disaster zone. 
Moreover, the bank regulatory agencies encouraged 
financial institutions to be flexible in providing finan-
cial services to noncustomers as long as the institutions 
maintained safe and sound banking practices. The 
agencies also asked financial institutions to consider 
other actions to assist area residents dealing with eco-
nomic disruptions, including providing immediate, 
short-term financial relief such as waiving certain fees 
(for example, ATM withdrawal fees) and arranging 
credit payment deferrals on some types of consumer 
loans. 
  Considering these responses by the financial 
community and its regulatory agencies, the authors 
concluded that consumers with established banking 
relationships were able relatively quickly to access their 
financial accounts and associated liquidity, financial 
services provided by financial institutions, and finan-
cial relief made available by financial institutions. On 
the other hand, unbanked consumers were found to be 
far more vulnerable to financial disruptions than those 
with established banking relationships. 
  To give a sense of the particular vulnerabili-
ties of Hurricane Katrina evacuees severely affected 
by the storm, Rhine first highlighted several findings 
from a survey of evacuees at the Houston Astrodome 
conducted by the Washington Post, the Kaiser Fam-
ily Foundation, and the Harvard School of Public 
Health.19 The results of this survey shed light on these 
evacuees’ socioeconomic characteristics: 98 percent 
were from the New Orleans area, 7 percent had fam-
ily income of less than $30,000 (and, therefore, fell in 
the low- and moderate-income category), 6 percent 
were unbanked, 72 percent did not own a credit card, 
and almost all were members of a minority group. 
  Rhine described several extenuating circum-
stances that contributed to the financial vulnerability 
of the Houston Astrodome evacuees and other un-
banked or low- and moderate-income Gulf Coast resi-
dents affected by the storm. As Guynn discussed in his 
keynote remarks, disruptions in mail service caused de-
lays in receiving critical check payments, for example, 
payroll, Social Security, supplemental Social Security 
income, and child support. In addition, because Hur-
ricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast at the end of the 
month, residents depending on first-of-the-month 
payments were particularly hard pressed to make ends 
meet. Rhine emphasized that this point clearly illus-
trates that in emergencies, direct deposit of income 
provides more benefits than just simple convenience.20 
In addition, Rhine noted that unbanked consumers 
from low- and moderate-income groups often had 
limited or no savings to draw on. This population also 
tended to rely more on check cashers and other non-
traditional money services businesses in their neighbor-
hoods to meet their financial services needs. Many of 
these single-office businesses were severely damaged 
or destroyed by the storm, leaving their customers with 
few, if any, alternatives. 
  Each of these circumstances added to the 
difficulties faced by those who were not part of the 
financial mainstream and contributed to these victims’ 
inability to easily access liquidity and other needed 
financial services. Reflecting on Braunstein’s earlier 
remarks, Rhine strongly agreed that an opportunity 
exists for financial educators to leverage the Katrina 
experience. In their paper, Cheney and Rhine address 
18 The Federal Reserve makes loans to depository institutions at 
the discount window using three main lending programs: primary 
credit, secondary credit, and seasonal credit. In addition, according 
to the Board’s website, “in unusual and exigent circumstances, 
the Board of Governors may authorize a Reserve Bank to provide 
emergency credit.” For more information on the Federal Reserve’s 
discount window, see http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/
discountwindowbook.cfm?hdrID=14&dtlID=43. 
19 The survey’s intent was to cover the population hardest hit by 
the hurricane: those who did not make it out of the city in time, 
those who had to rely on government help to evacuate, and those 
who did not have access to alternative shelter on their own. The 
survey was conducted September 10-12, 200.
20 The benefits of direct deposit apply to both unbanked and 
banked populations who still choose to receive payments by paper 
check. To reinforce this point, Rhine referenced a U.S. Department 
of the Treasury survey that showed that 32 million of 72 million 
baby boomers do not use direct deposit, nor do they want to. See 
“Survey Reveals Baby Boomers Lag Seniors in Direct Deposit Us-
age,” Press Release, December 27, 200, www.fms.treas.gov/news/
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the importance of developing curricula to teach the 
benefits of establishing an account with a mainstream 
financial institution, using direct deposit and other 
electronic payment applications, and maintaining a 
level of savings to safeguard against emergencies. As 
Rhine noted, these educational messages are relevant 
to all income groups, but when traditionally unbanked 
low- and moderate-income consumers are faced with 
unexpected financial disruptions, these practices can 
provide a lifeline.
  Because they recognized the vulnerabilities 
and unique needs of unbanked and low- and moder-
ate-income Gulf Coast residents, government and 
relief agencies used prepaid and electronic benefit 
transfer (EBT) cards to facilitate the delivery of fi-
nancial relief. Cheney briefly described the card-based 
programs offered by the American Red Cross, FEMA, 
and various state governments (Louisiana, Mississippi, 
and Alabama). Taken as a whole, these efforts reflect 
the general trend toward electronic payments and an 
appreciation of the advantages provided by card-based 
payment applications over checks and cash. 
  Both the American Red Cross and FEMA 
used branded prepaid cards, although the American 
Red Cross program was decidedly more successful 
than FEMA’s program, which was discontinued after 
a few days. Alternatively, state governments leveraged 
existing EBT card programs to deliver food benefits 
and cash assistance to residents of their states. As 
the authors note in the paper, EBT cards seemed 
to be particularly effective, largely, Cheney argued, 
because relief was distributed through an existing 
payments infrastructure and with a product type 
generally familiar to area residents. The American 
Red Cross’s prepaid card relief program benefited from 
the Red Cross’s experience in planning and testing 
prepaid cards as a way to deliver financial relief in a 
disaster. The value of the experience and planning in 
successfully executing these programs was reinforced 
throughout the day’s discussions, and the topic is 
addressed again in later sections of this conference 
summary.
  Cheney highlighted several benefits to using 
prepaid cards for disaster relief. Prepaid cards are less 
costly than traditional paper check disbursements 
(roughly $0.20 per electronic transfer as opposed to an 
average of $1.00 to $2.00 per check).21 Additionally, 
they are often a safer and quicker way for families 
to access emergency funds. Prepaid cards eliminate 
the need for cashing a relief check and for carrying 
large amounts of cash. Branded prepaid cards also 
offer the convenience of being accepted at merchants 
and ATMs where similarly branded debit and credit 
cards are accepted. Even disaster victims evacuated 
to remote locations were able to use prepaid cards to 
meet their immediate needs. The experiences of the 
prepaid and EBT card programs led the authors to 
conclude that these cards can be a particularly useful 
way to deliver financial relief, especially to unbanked 
and low- and moderate-income disaster victims who 
may not have other alternatives. 
  Next, Cheney emphasized a significant finding 
from her research with Rhine: When structuring 
prepaid card relief programs, organizations need to 
strike a balance between bringing financial relief to 
families quickly and efficiently and controlling fraud 
and other misuse. This balance is inherently addressed 
in several decisions that determine the characteristics 
of a particular prepaid card relief program, including 
the procedures for confirming an applicant’s identity 
and eligibility and the functions that will be provided 
as part of the card program, for example, whether the 
cards will be reloadable or whether they will restrict 
the types of merchants at which purchases can be 
made. 
  On the basis of these and other issues that sur-
faced during her research with Rhine, Cheney posed 
several questions to conference participants to consid-
er. She suggested that addressing these areas may result 
in new insights about ways to help make the recovery 
from catastrophic events smoother, more efficient, and 
less stressful for those affected. 
These questions were:
1.  How can we verify individuals’ identities and 
eligibility for financial relief in disasters?
2.  Are there reasons to enhance data-sharing af-
ter a disaster? If so, how can this be achieved?
3.  How can prepaid cards and electronic benefit 
transfer cards be better leveraged as delivery 
mechanisms for financial relief?
21 See Eric Miller, “Payroll Debit Cards,” proceedings from the con-
ference on Stored Value: The Shape of Things to Come, Pelorus 
Group, October 2004. In addition to the costs of check printing, 
employers save by reducing or eliminating costs related to distribu-
tion, escheat compliance, replacement of lost or stolen checks, 
check fraud, error correction, and reconciliation for termination 
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4.  How can the coordination of public- and pri-
vate-sector efforts be improved?
.  What is the role of financial educators? 
  In a discussion following the formal presenta-
tion, several participants referred to the clear benefits 
provided by electronic payments over paper-based 
methods and raised the possibility of federally mandat-
ing electronic payment of all government disburse-
ments. In response, Braunstein and others noted that 
this was exactly what had been envisioned with elec-
tronic transfer accounts (ETAs). ETAs were designed 
by the U.S. Department of the Treasury as a way for 
consumers to receive federal payments electronically, 
and they were part of its electronic fund transfer pro-
gram of 1999. But for a variety of reasons, consumers 
have not widely adopted ETAs for this purpose.22  In 
support, Paul Simpson, of JPMorgan Chase, cited the 
success of EBT cards. He noted that one of the rea-
sons the food stamp program and its use of EBT cards 
worked well as a distribution method for disaster relief 
was the result of mandatory electronic distribution. 
Several participants suggested that perhaps it is time to 
reconsider broader legislation aimed at electronifying 
all government payments and to do so in combination 
with a supporting program of consumer education. 
c. Electronic Payment Applications as Tools for 
Delivering Financial Relief: Are Prepaid and Elec-
tronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) Cards the Way of the 
Future?
  The first panel focused on the mechanics 
of delivering disaster relief payments using both pa-
per-based and electronic distribution methods. As 
described by the moderator, Gary Palmer, of eFunds 
Corporation, the intent was to examine the fairly com-
plicated processes and the various parties involved in 
support of these payment systems. Panelists drew on 
their experiences in responding to Hurricane Katrina 
and shared observations on how they managed the in-
terdependencies among the various parties. They also 
considered what might be done to improve the ability 
of payment providers and their partners to deliver and 
process consumer payments faster and more efficiently 
in disasters. Palmer emphasized the benefits of having 
on the panel experts on a range of payment products,  
including checks, electronic benefit transfer cards, and 
prepaid cards. The panel included Robert Mange, U.S. 
Department of the Treasury; Doug Perry, U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture; Paul Simpson, JPMorgan Chase; 
and Scott Galit, MasterCard International.
  Given his background in prepaid cards, Palmer 
introduced the session by describing the complexity in-
herent in delivering disaster relief payments using these 
cards, a relatively new but promising alternative distri-
bution method. He began by cataloging several of the 
steps, business needs, and organizations that contribute 
to a disaster response prepaid card program, beginning 
with the production of the physical card plastic. 
  Manufacturing card plastic normally takes 
several weeks and involves the bank card issuer, the 
program provider (for example, the Red Cross, Salva-
tion Army, or FEMA), and the company that produces 
the plastic. As a result, the production process can 
create a bottleneck in a large-scale disaster unless suf-
ficient inventory has been stored in advance. Even if 
card plastic is readily available, Palmer emphasized that 
transporting the product into a disaster zone can be a 
complicated undertaking in an unsettled local envi-
ronment, necessitating coordination with local, state, 
and federal relief and law enforcement agencies. In 
addition, effective on-site distribution relies on estab-
lishing a secure network of on-the-ground personnel 
to manage the interaction with recipients, as part of, 
for example, efforts to register or enroll applicants for 
aid, transmit data, or educate cardholders. During the 
distribution period, remote call centers will likely expe-
rience spikes in volume, often straining existing service 
capacity. 
  Finally, Palmer noted that procedures for fund-
ing and clearing and settlement must be established 
and tested by all parties involved: the bank card issuer, 
the program provider, the transaction processors, and 
the underlying networks. 
  The processes and challenges described were 
not intended to be all-inclusive for prepaid cards but 
rather to illustrate the sophistication required to man-
age a card-based program efficiently and seamlessly. 
Palmer noted that all payment delivery mechanisms 
carry their own set of complexities and share the chal-
lenges of meeting human and financial needs in poten-
tially dangerous environments following a catastrophic 
event. 
In closing, Palmer emphasized that when us-
ing card-based technology to deliver financial relief 
and access to financial services, this complexity makes  22 For more information, see www.fms.treas.gov/eta/.14 - Role of Electronic Payments in Disaster Recovery www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc
planning and coordination among the many stakehold-
ers in each aspect of delivery and execution critical to 
successful outcomes. 
  The U.S. Department of the Treasury and, spe-
cifically, the Financial Management Service (FMS) play 
a significant role in facilitating payments. FMS issues 
over $1. trillion annually in government payments, 
including disbursements related to Social Security, vet-
erans benefits, income tax returns, and other federal 
payments.23 The majority of these payments are made 
by electronic funds transfer (EFT) to an established 
bank account, that is, by direct deposit; the rest are 
made by check.24 Robert Mange, director of FMS’s Re-
gional Financial Center in Austin, Texas,2 described his 
experience in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in main-
taining EFT and check processing of traditional govern-
ment payments while also meeting increased demand as 
the issuer of all FEMA payments in the region. Mange 
estimated that since September 1, 200, the Austin 
Regional Financial Center has issued over 2.9 million 
FEMA disaster relief payments, or about $7 billion.       
  Mange described in more detail aspects of the 
operational coordination between FEMA and FMS’s 
Regional Financial Center in Austin following Hurri-
cane Katrina. FEMA transmitted payment instructions 
to the Austin center four times a day: twice in the 
morning and twice in the afternoon. These instruc-
tions specified payment by check or by direct deposit. 
Payments were issued the same day for all instructions 
received in the morning. For instructions received in 
the afternoon, only EFT payments were issued the 
same day; checks were issued the following day. As a 
result, recipients who chose to receive their relief funds 
as a direct deposit were generally able to access these 
funds the next day, thereby eliminating delays related 
to timing, printing and mailing checks, and — perhaps 
more important for disaster victims — navigating the 
damaged infrastructure in order to cash a relief check. 
Mange used this example to also emphasize that ac-
count ownership and the ability to receive direct 
deposits have critical value for individuals caught in a 
disaster.
  Next, Mange considered the challenges faced 
in delivering checks in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina. It quickly became apparent that applicants 
for relief were providing addresses that, in many cases, 
were associated with houses destroyed or made unin-
habitable by the storm. As a result, a majority of relief 
checks mailed to these addresses were returned as un-
deliverable. Mange shared estimates indicating that 0 
percent of all benefit checks, including Social Security 
and other types of disaster relief checks, were returned 
as undeliverable in the first few weeks after the storm. 
In some regions of New Orleans, this percentage was as 
high as 70 percent. In September alone, Mange noted 
that 47 percent of all FEMA checks were returned. 
Moreover, from September 200 through April 2006, 
76 percent of the 63,000 total checks issued on behalf 
of FEMA were returned as undeliverable. Obviously, 
in addition to the standard delays presented by checks 
and compared with direct deposit, these delivery fail-
ure rates further emphasized the limitations of checks 
as a method for quickly providing liquidity to victims 
following a catastrophic event.26  
  In summary, Mange highlighted two key con-
clusions from his experience:
1.   The efficiencies electronic payments provide 
for consumers in a catastrophe27 and
2.   The importance of capturing and sharing 
updated contact data on evacuees, especially 
those victims who continue to choose checks 
as their payment method.
  Doug Perry, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
discussed his experience with a benefits program that 
relies on an electronic payment application as its only 
distribution method: the EBT card. The Food and Nu-
trition Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
administers the food stamp program.28 Benefit recipi-
ents use their EBT cards and personal identification 
23 For more information, see www.fms.treas.gov/aboutfms/index.
html.
24 For more information, see www.fms.treas.gov/aboutfms/
welcometofms.html.
2 The FMS Austin Regional Financial Center processes over 17 
million payments each year, or about $33 billion.
26 The U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve 
sponsor education campaigns to describe the benefits associated 
with direct deposit. As one example, Mange highlighted the 
GoDirect campaign. For more information on the GoDirect cam-
paign, see www.godirect.org/
27 Despite these advantages, Mange noted that some people still 
prefer to receive their benefits in the form of a physical check, and 
the Treasury’s check distribution system is quite efficient: It has a 
99.7 percent on time and accuracy rating, disasters aside.
28 States are able to use the EBT system to distribute Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families and other state-administered benefit 
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numbers (PINs) to authorize transfers of their govern-
ment benefits from a federal account to a retailer’s ac-
count to pay for products received. Behind the scenes, 
purchase authorization and clearing and settlement 
take place as part of an electronic process between the 
retailer and the EBT card issuer or its processor.29 
  Since food stamp benefits were converted to 
electronic payments, Perry noted, the benefits distribu-
tion process has worked very effectively, even allowing 
the flexibility to provide supplemental benefits,30 paid 
overnight to registered recipients, and to modify the 
timing of such payments. As a result, Perry said, these 
state programs are able to provide benefits earlier than 
scheduled as well as supplemental emergency relief 
funds to residents who may be in the path of a hurri-
cane or other natural disaster. Consequently, residents 
have earlier access to relief funds and can use these 
funds to prepare for a disaster, for example, by purchas-
ing necessities or paying for evacuation expenses. 
  Perry noted that while the distribution process 
is reasonably smooth, the application process is an 
area where the Food and Nutrition Service continues 
to search for improvements. For example, in states in 
the Southeast, new recipients must apply in person but 
cannot leave the on-site application facility with their 
benefits. Instead, applicants must wait for an approval 
process to be completed. Perry noted that the applica-
tion process as it exists was initially established to limit 
the potential for fraud, but, during natural disasters, 
these registration controls make it difficult to deliver 
financial relief to new applicants in a timely manner. 
  Despite this constraint, using EBT cards to de-
liver financial relief during the recent Gulf Coast hur-
ricanes, Perry emphasized, worked extremely well. He 
attributed this success to three key factors: 
1.  The payments infrastructure was in place;
2.  Protocols for issuing and distributing benefits 
were well established and well understood; and   
3.  Recipients generally understood how these 
cards functioned. 
In fact, Perry noted that EBT cards were used to dis-
tribute $22 million and $300 million in food stamp 
benefits in Louisiana and Texas, respectively, in the 
wake of hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
  Paul Simpson, JPMorgan Chase, agreed with 
Perry’s assessment of EBT cards’ effectiveness, not-
ing that his company was the issuer behind not only 
the EBT cards but also the American Red Cross and 
FEMA prepaid cards. Because of his experience with 
all three programs, Simpson brought a unique perspec-
tive to the discussion that allowed him to contrast 
these programs and identify strategic hurdles that must 
be addressed regardless of the card payment applica-
tion. 
  A critical lesson from Simpson’s experience 
was that in cases where planning had been a priority 
and program processes, procedures, and distribution 
points had already been established, the card programs 
worked very well. When planning had not been done 
and programs were being organized on the fly, insur-
mountable challenges arose in meeting the critical 
response times necessary to quickly get relief to Hur-
ricane Katrina victims. Simpson emphasized that a suc-
cessful program for using prepaid cards in disaster relief 
cannot be organized in a day or two; rather, it requires 
all involved parties to focus their attention for an ex-
tended period in order to effectively address the many 
behind-the-scenes steps that must be taken to support 
program development and delivery. He observed that 
in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the financial ser-
vices industry needs to consider how to better prepare 
public-sector partners involved in disaster relief in un-
derstanding the details of card-based programs and the 
level of planning required to ensure a safe and reliable 
payment application is delivered to victims of a cata-
strophic event.
  Simpson also expanded on a point introduced 
in an earlier session: The Hurricane Katrina experi-
ence clearly demonstrated the benefits of receiving 
income and financial relief electronically rather than 
through paper-based alternatives. Simpson suggested 
that to continue to support consumer adoption of elec-
tronic forms of payment, the federal government may 
need to consider mandating all government payments 
be made electronically. With the support of the federal 
government, Simpson believed that both public- and 
private-sector stakeholders would be better positioned 
to set priorities and dedicate resources to developing 
electronic payment infrastructures that may be lever-
29 For more information, see http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/ebt/FAQ.
htm.
30 Perry noted that supplemental benefits are in addition to stan-
dard benefit amounts but may not exceed the maximum benefit 
limit set by the Food and Nutrition Service. Supplemental benefits 
are a way to distribute disaster relief to area residents over and 
above what recipients may qualify to receive as part of the standard 
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aged, as EBT cards already have been, to effectively 
deliver financial relief to victims in a crisis.
  Picking up this discussion thread, Scott 
Galit, MasterCard International, noted that payment 
networks such as MasterCard International are in a 
unique position to bring together a broad set of con-
stituencies to work on coordination issues. Given the 
central role played by networks in connecting many of 
the parties involved in disaster relief payments, Galit 
noted that acting as a facilitator is a natural role for 
networks. He cited several areas where network con-
tributions can make a difference, including educating 
consumers about the benefits of electronic payments, 
explaining to nonbank partners the processes behind 
a consumer electronic payment, helping to coordinate 
the public and private sectors in contingency plan-
ning, and supporting technology development aimed at 
improving verification of identity and eligibility during 
the application process. In closing, Galit emphasized 
the numerous ways that networks contribute to edu-
cating both cardholders and merchants with respect to 
a variety of payment-card-related topics. By leveraging 
its existing communication channels with these con-
stituencies, MasterCard International is also providing 
information that specifically addresses responses to 
disasters.
  In the discussion that followed, participants 
focused on two related issues: privacy and fraud. Hur-
ricane Katrina showed that during emergencies, when 
people are vulnerable and in need of financial relief, 
expectations about consumer privacy and related 
limitations on data sharing may become an obstacle to 
quickly getting funds to those in need. The inability of 
relevant parties to obtain up-to-date contact informa-
tion for disaster victims was cited as one example of 
how a lack of data sharing frustrated the disaster relief 
process, making it difficult to serve the needs of disas-
ter victims. For example, banks with access only to ex-
isting records for their customers were often unable to 
contact customers in the disaster region, even though 
the individuals may have registered updated informa-
tion with a relief organization, government agency, or 
other entity. In many cases, these organizations were 
unable to broadly share such information with private-
sector banks and other service providers. As a second 
example, Mange described the difficulties the U.S. De-
partment of the Treasury experienced in mailing gov-
ernment checks to old addresses based on stale contact 
data received from its government partners. In the 
end, several participants suggested that a need exists 
for a centralized database of information related to di-
saster victims that is accessible to all authorized stake-
holders. While most thought this a sensible approach, 
others cited privacy concerns that might arise or even 
conflicts with existing privacy laws that would need to 
be addressed in order to develop such a database and 
provide shared access to this type of information. 
  On the subject of fraud, it was noted that 
there are two primary types of fraud to consider when 
structuring disaster relief programs: application and 
transaction fraud. Application fraud occurs when ineli-
gible individuals apply for benefits using false or stolen 
information or when a single eligible individual at-
tempts to apply for the same benefits more than once. 
One participant noted that limiting this form of fraud 
requires answering three key questions: 
1.   Is the applicant the person he says he is? 
2.   Was he, in fact, harmed by the catastrophic 
event? 
3.   Has he already received benefits? 
Authenticating and confirming an applicant’s eligibility 
in a situation such as this — where a large number of 
people were affected and significant damage occurred 
across a wide area — is challenging and may require 
some combination of enhanced technology, data-shar-
ing protocols, cross-channel controls, and coordination 
between the public and private sectors. Simpson cap-
tured the general feeling among participants when he 
stated that on-site authentication of applicants in such 
a large-scale disaster is “one of, if not the single, largest 
challenge program organizers face.”
  Transaction fraud31 generally occurs either 
when an unauthorized person uses a lost or stolen pre-
paid disaster relief card to purchase goods or services or 
when authorized cardholders use these cards for seem-
ingly “nonemergency” goods and services, such as pur-
chases made at merchants selling alcohol, jewelry, or 
firearms. Some participants suggested that to address 
transaction fraud, card issuers should limit card ac-
ceptance to preapproved types of merchants or, if pos-
sible, restrict purchases to authorized merchandise.32 In 
response, Michael Brackney noted that the Red Cross’s 
31 Transaction fraud may also be called payment card fraud.
32 Several participants made the point that while prepaid cards offer 
improved tracking of purchases, the same due diligence is impos-
sible when relief funds are converted to cash, since cash is intrinsi-
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experience suggests that as time passes, there may be 
more reason to restrict card use because abuses and 
criminal fraud tend to emerge as we get further away 
from the event. Moreover, Kim Brock, of Florida’s De-
partment of Children and Families, noted that in the 
immediate aftermath of a catastrophic event “everyone 
needs food, water, and shelter” and quickly getting 
aid to victims has positive economic and social con-
sequences, including reducing incentives to criminal 
activity. 
  In conclusion, several participants argued that 
it would be at least inefficient to get into the business 
of determining whether an emergency purchase was 
indeed “appropriate”; rather, providers of relief might 
be better off focusing on developing improved methods 
to validate victims’ identities and eligibility at the point 
of application, particularly when responding to large-
scale events. Other participants emphasized that while 
no one is recommending that relief agencies police all 
purchases made by disaster victims, it is incumbent 
upon disaster relief agencies that are distributing funds 
taken from taxpayer dollars or private contributions 
to vigorously investigate all instances of potential 
fraud. Brackney emphasized that such investigations 
are conducted by the American Red Cross, FEMA, 
and others. Describing the Red Cross’s experience 
in more detail, Brackney noted that prepaid cards 
were distributed to over 1.4 million families as part of 
Katrina-related disaster relief efforts, and among these 
cases, the Red Cross identified about 7,000 incidents 
of “questionable” behavior. While the questionable 
use of disaster relief funds was generally limited, the 
Red Cross is reviewing each of these cases for potential 
application or transaction fraud.33
d. Public- and Private-Sector Partnerships: How and 
When Do These Work Well?
  Rear Admiral James B. Plehal (USN, Ret.), 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), introduced 
the afternoon session, which incorporated the areas 
identified in the morning sessions into strategies to 
further strengthen the resiliency of our financial sys-
tem. Plehal’s long history of professional involvement 
in coordinating partners that provide infrastructure 
security served him well in setting a framework for this 
discussion. Currently, Plehal is a business liaison in the 
Office of the Private Sector at DHS, but he has also 
served as the deputy director of the National Infra-
structure Protection Center and as director of the In-
formation and Warning Division, Information Analysis 
and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, Department 
of Homeland Security. This experience uniquely posi-
tioned him to speak to the issue of where opportunities 
may exist for better coordinated efforts between the 
public and private sectors. 
  Echoing portions of the morning discussion 
that highlighted improving planning to establish pro-
cesses, procedures, and protocols for disaster relief card 
programs, Plehal noted that partnering, planning, and 
information exchange are indeed key components of 
the mission of the DHS and its Office of the Private 
Sector. In his liaison role and in support of FEMA’s 
prepaid card program, Plehal worked with both finan-
cial institutions and retail merchants. This experience 
led him to look for areas in the development and ex-
ecution of disaster relief prepaid card programs where 
coordination and collaboration among these parties 
and between these parties and government agencies 
can lead to strengthening of financial safety nets. He 
noted that these efforts are particularly important for 
those underserved consumers who faced many of the 
vulnerabilities described earlier by Cheney and Rhine. 
  Plehal stressed that Hurricane Katrina’s size 
and location greatly contributed to the unprecedented 
destruction in the region and presented responders 
with problems of an immensity that had not been en-
countered with previous hurricanes. Plehal noted that 
with such widespread and long-lasting destruction to 
the transportation, electricity, telecommunications, 
and physical infrastructures, Hurricane Katrina did not 
allow for pre-existing plans to be scaled to a point that 
could be useful in the storm’s immediate aftermath. 
Moreover, DHS faced several of the same challenges 
described earlier, including difficulties accessing af-
fected areas and doing so in a way that ensured the 
security of on-the-ground personnel involved in logisti-
cal planning and, then, managing priorities among the 
many needs of local, state, and federal agencies. 
33 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report 
in February 2006 titled “Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hur-
ricanes Katrina and Rita: FEMA’s Control Weaknesses Exposed 
the Government to Significant Fraud and Abuse.” This report 
addresses both application and transaction fraud stemming from 
FEMA’s relief program. The GAO’s analysis found weaknesses in 
the application process, but when addressing transaction fraud, the 
GAO noted that the “majority of (noncash) transactions was as-
sociated with purchases of food, clothing, and personal necessities.” 
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  While Plehal was not directly involved in 
planning or developing FEMA’s prepaid card program, 
he was asked to work with local financial institu-
tions and retail merchants to introduce the program. 
Plehal described several questions raised during dis-
cussions with these entities and grouped them into 
four broad areas: prepaid card functionality, program 
rules, program implementation, and education of 
cardholders, merchants, and financial institutions. Is-
sues concerning prepaid card functionality included 
considerations such as how much to limit amounts 
loaded to the cards, whether to allow cash-back op-
tions at the point of sale, and whether to restrict card 
use either to merchants selling necessities or to specific 
types of products. Plehal observed that program rules 
include decisions about the design of card plastic, the 
consistency of card functionality with that of other 
relief agency prepaid cards, and the application of sales 
tax. He grouped program implementation issues with 
those related to the production of card plastic and its 
delivery to a disaster region, the application process for 
relief recipients, and the fund loading and transaction 
processing procedures. 
  Finally, Plehal emphasized that the breadth of 
topics covered in the first three areas brought to light 
a need to develop communication strategies not only 
to educate prepaid card recipients but also to build 
relationships with private-sector partners that play 
key roles in supporting card-based payments. In short, 
Plehal’s experiences reinforced an earlier observation 
about the complexity of these programs and empha-
sized the need for planning and better coordination of 
public- and private-sector efforts.
  Based on his Hurricane Katrina experience, 
Plehal concluded by outlining two key success factors 
in building public- and private-sector partnerships not 
only in the payments arena but also more generally: 
1. Planning and coordination must happen ahead 
of a crisis; and
2. Both private- and public-sector entities would 
do well to rely on the expertise of partners 
when these entities step outside their own 
areas of expertise. 
e. Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina and 
Looking Toward the Future
  The second panel was introduced by modera-
tor T. Jack Williams, Tier Technologies, who stressed 
that this session’s goal was to consider the steps needed 
to continue work toward strengthening our financial 
networks in the face of weather-related or other types 
of disasters. Building on Plehal’s remarks, he noted 
that a specific objective of this session was to point out 
opportunities to improve coordination between the 
public and private sectors. In fact, many of Williams’s 
professional responsibilities with Tier Technologies 
involve facilitating such collaborations, particularly as 
they pertain to the use of card-based applications for 
distributing federal and state benefits. 
  Williams focused panelists’ remarks by posing 
the question: “What keeps you up at night?” Then, 
he asked each panelist to share his or her thoughts 
on how the risks he or she has identified might be 
mitigated in the future. Williams noted that he wanted 
the group to broaden the scope of the discussion to 
consider actions that may be applied in response to 
manmade disasters and pandemics as well to natural 
disasters. The panel included perspectives from the 
public sector and national relief agencies: Stephen 
Middlebrook, U.S. Department of the Treasury; 
Diane Rath, State of Texas Workforce Commission; 
and Michael Brackney, American Red Cross. It also 
included perspectives from private-sector payment 
service providers: Jack Antonini, Cardtronics; John 
Gruce, Bank of America; Frank D’Angelo, Metavante; 
and Stan Paur, Discover/Pulse EFT Association. 
Each panelist considered Williams’s question when 
describing possible strategies to further strengthen the 
structure for delivering disaster relief payments and 
restoring financial services following a catastrophe.
  Public-sector panelists recommended a general 
strategy: to improve integration among local, state, 
and federal government agencies, national relief agen-
cies, and the financial services industry. In defining the 
term integration, panelists primarily specified efforts to 
respond to disasters. But as both Williams and Plehal 
emphasized, integration of response goes hand in hand 
with integration of preparedness. 
  To help participants think about improving 
integration, Stephen Middlebrook, U.S. Department of 
the Treasury, proposed a framework using four progres-
sive stages: 
1.  Developing communication channels;
2.   Sharing information;
3.   Exchanging processes; and
4.   Using a single payment device. 
Middlebrook noted that the first stage is relatively gen-
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ence are one way to build channels of communication 
among interested organizations. 
  As Middlebrook envisions the process, in-
formation sharing provides various stakeholders with 
access to consolidated information on disaster victims, 
including data related to benefits registration, evacu-
ees’ contact information, and benefits payments. Cur-
rently, as Diane Rath noted, much of these data are 
maintained in separate places or by different agencies, 
and retrieving them in an emergency is costly and in-
efficient. Rath emphasized that by consolidating this 
information and providing organizations with need-to-
know access to the data, stakeholders can potentially 
eliminate duplication of effort, for example, when 
different organizations attempt to register the same 
person for benefits or services and when recipients try 
to register with multiple organizations for financial 
relief. Such information sharing, Rath argued, would 
lead to more efficient and better ways to serve all aid 
recipients and the providers of such aid whether they 
are state, federal, or not-for-profit agencies.
  From the nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) sector, Brackney described a database initiative 
that, in the Red Cross’s experience, has worked well in 
facilitating data sharing among member relief agencies. 
The American Red Cross partnered with other NGOs 
to develop a database system called the Coordinated 
Assistance Network (CAN).34 The CAN system al-
lows a “client”3 to apply once for a range of benefits. 
Once a recipient is registered, the application data are 
shared with other participating relief agencies who are 
members of the network. In this way, the data-shar-
ing system allows electronic referrals to multiple relief 
agencies, limits duplication of effort since the client 
registers only once, and is generally a more efficient 
way for organizations to distribute benefits. To date, 3. 
million potential recipients are registered in the CAN 
database. Brackney proposed that the CAN system 
may serve as a constructive example for the structure 
of a broader data-sharing initiative.
  The next stage in Middlebrook’s framework 
takes the concept of data sharing a step further: ex-
changing information related to underlying business 
processes and procedures. For example, exchanging 
processes may mean sharing protocols pertaining to the 
benefits registration process, the eligibility determina-
tion process, and the payment process. A key reason 
for sharing processes, Middlebrook noted, is to develop 
best practices for planning responses to emergencies. 
Rath acknowledged that states and local communities 
may particularly benefit from a best practices approach, 
saving both time and expense by allowing these gov-
ernments to leverage the experiences of their sister 
communities. At the same time, several participants 
questioned whether the federal government would 
need to take the lead in order to facilitate information 
sharing among state and local communities.
  Middlebrook characterized the final stage as 
the introduction of a single payment device that would 
enable multiple organizations to load funds on the card 
and track the funds by type of benefit or payment. As 
envisioned, the common payment device could be is-
sued to all disaster victims or even beforehand to all 
U.S. citizens. In response, Brackney suggested that a 
single device may be the ultimate solution but getting 
there might best be achieved through a more iterative 
process. He suggested that, as an initial step, financial 
institutions and their partners now have an opportu-
nity, based on their experiences with Hurricane Ka-
trina, to standardize the financial products and services 
applied in response to disasters. In this way, Brackney 
noted, an “in-the-box” solution would be easier and 
quicker to activate in a disaster and it would be easier 
to build advance awareness of it among the general 
population.
  Middlebrook stressed that making progress in 
each of these phases of integration will require atten-
tion to legal and regulatory issues. As an attorney, Mid-
dlebrook described several legal issues in areas such as 
privacy law, intellectual property law, and consumer 
protection law that may need to be addressed in order 
to, ultimately, move toward better integration between 
the public and private sectors.
  In terms of privacy law, Middlebrook noted 
that the federal government and its agencies operate 
under the Privacy Act of 1974.36 The act governs fed-
eral agencies’ collection and use of personal informa-
tion about individuals. In particular, the act prohibits 
the disclosure of personal information without the 
34 For more information on the Coordinated Assistance Network 
(CAN), see www.can.org/.
3 Brackney used the term client to refer to an individual who ap-
plied to receive funds from a relief agency.
36 For reference, the full text of the federal Privacy Act of 1974 can 
be found at http://www.usdoj.gov/foia/privstat.htm. An overview 
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individual’s consent unless the disclosure falls within 
a handful of narrow exceptions. Several participants 
stressed that greater flexibility in data-sharing rules 
would help organizations, when dealing with disasters, 
to quickly identify victims’ needs, the status of exist-
ing and potential new benefits, and financial account 
relationships. Middlebrook responded that while such 
data sharing may be more efficient, it also raises issues 
because, in this scenario, multiple organizations would 
be able to access consumer data for various purposes. 
In particular, it raises legal questions as to the entity 
that owns the data, the entity responsible for manag-
ing the data, and the entity liable if the data are stolen, 
misused, or inaccurate.  
  Intellectual property law is particularly rel-
evant as business processes and payment devices are 
shared. To the extent that business processes are pro-
prietary or technology is patented, Middlebrook noted 
that organizations would have to determine and con-
tractually agree on provisional access and use of this 
intellectual property. Government agencies may also 
have restrictions on the extent to which they share 
processes with other agencies or across levels of gov-
ernment that need to be considered. 
  With regard to consumer protection law, 
Middlebrook emphasized that using a single payment 
device may cloud the roles played by traditional service 
or benefits providers and, therefore, may raise liability-
related questions with regard to consumer rights and 
protections. Careful examination of these issues would 
have to be a part of each of the proposed steps toward 
further integration of disaster planning and response.
   Despite legal issues constraining a more inte-
grated response, the private-sector panelists noted that 
the response to Hurricane Katrina offered numerous 
examples, several of which were described in earlier 
sessions, in which the financial services industry coor-
dinated well with government and national relief agen-
cies and with each other to meet the needs of disaster-
area residents. At the same time, panelists pointed out 
several areas where further improvement may be made. 
  Jack Antonini, of Cardtronics, described his 
company’s experience in managing its network of 
ATMs in the Gulf Coast. Cardtronics had 300 ATMs 
that were out of service following Hurricane Katrina. 
As a result, cash in these damaged machines was 
generally contaminated and, in some cases, destroyed 
or lost, for example, completely washed away by the 
storm. As one of the largest nonbank ATM operators, 
Cardtronics has standard contingency plans that al-
low the company to deliver cash safely and securely in 
areas affected by natural disasters. Additionally, and 
in part as a result of its experience with Hurricane 
Katrina, Cardtronics enhanced its contingency plans 
to allow a staged removal of cash immediately before 
a forecasted disaster hits a region and to restore cash 
immediately afterward. In so doing, Cardtronics hopes 
to limit potential losses but still allow local residents 
maximum accessibility to cash. In further support of 
Cardtronics’ cash delivery management processes, An-
tonini presented a plan to build mobile cash transports 
to safely and securely move cash quickly into disaster 
zones and to provide critical services for disaster vic-
tims. As he envisions them, these mobile transport 
vehicles would have satellite communications, and 
therefore, they would not rely on the local communi-
cation infrastructure. They could also be used to make 
available services outside traditional banking, such as 
filling prescriptions and allowing people to send e-mail 
via satellite to family outside the disaster zone.  
  John Gruce, of Bank of America, reiterated 
that the steps taken by financial institutions to help 
victims of Hurricane Katrina were generally success-
ful, providing financial relief, serving critical financial 
needs of both customers and noncustomers, and main-
taining the flow of payments. At the same time, the 
experience of the financial services industry brought to 
light several areas where opportunities exist to improve 
contingency planning and execution. For example, al-
most immediately, it became clear that demand for and 
production of card plastic presented real challenges. 
Bank of America’s experiences have also motivated an 
examination of its card-ordering, card-activation, and 
card-funding processes to ensure that these systems 
are sufficiently scalable to meet increased demand in 
future catastrophes. 
  Frank D’Angelo, Metavante, focused on his 
company’s role as a payment processor. In that role, 
Metavante, through its many business relationships, in-
directly touches over 4 million consumers across the 
United States. For D’Angelo, the experience of Hurri-
cane Katrina brought to light a need for more inclusive 
continuity planning, reaching beyond Metavante’s pro-
prietary systems and extending to the disaster recovery 
plans of its business partners. For example, although 
Metavante’s processing systems may be functioning 
after a disaster, it is possible that its business partners’ 
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whether there is an appropriate role for Metavante and 
other processors to play in helping business partners 
develop contingency plans and, in the case of a catas-
trophe, in restoring data transmissions for these part-
ners. D’Angelo noted that this potential role for major 
payment processors reinforced the earlier discussion 
by the public-sector panelists related to the need for 
increased integration in disaster recovery planning. In 
the end, D’Angelo’s suggestion was that there may also 
need to be better integration among the various pri-
vate-sector parties involved in the payments process.
  When considering Williams’s question about 
what keeps you up at night, Stan Paur, of Discover’s 
Pulse EFT Association, said that, given the experience 
of Hurricane Katrina, his sense was that the financial 
community’s contingency plans were generally proven 
to be effective in responding to a single catastrophic 
event. In the case of Pulse, based in Houston, Texas, 
many years of experience in responding to hurricanes 
led to reconfigurations of Pulse’s data systems and tele-
communications networks to ensure redundancies. As 
a result, Pulse was able to continue operations without 
downtime after hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
  Keeping Paur up at night, though, is the issue 
of whether this adeptness at dealing with a single event 
would carry over if the country were hit with multiple, 
simultaneous incidents. Indeed, his fear is that such a 
situation could cripple key payment systems. Conse-
quently, this experience caused him to weigh whether 
it is sufficient for individual companies to have es-
tablished single or multiple redundant capabilities or 
rather should back-up systems be built to support and 
provide coverage for multiple participants, even com-
petitors, playing key roles in our payment networks. As 
an example, Paur described a possible scenario where 
one debit or credit card network’s processing sites, 
including any back-up sites, would be rendered inoper-
able. In this case, Paur asked whether other networks 
could be used during the outage to maintain the flow 
of payments.  
In summary, Paur suggested that broader con-
tingency planning that takes into account multiple si-
multaneous events is an area to which further thought 
might be given. At the same time, he noted that such 
an effort will present challenges due to the numerous 
interdependent entities involved in executing an elec-
tronic payment. 
  In the discussion that followed the panelists’ 
formal remarks, participants considered again the im-
portant role played by electronic payments in disaster 
recovery. Gruce reiterated the notion of aggressively 
promoting or even mandating electronic payment not 
only of critical government payments but also of pay-
roll disbursements. In response, Rath noted that while 
there may be a good argument for electronic payment 
of government-issued payments, the electronic pay-
ment of payroll may not be realistic, given the large 
number of small employers that pay employees in cash. 
She stated that, in Texas, 70 percent of employers have 
fewer than 10 employees and many of these businesses 
have cash-based payrolls. She stressed that it would be 
very difficult, if not impossible, to force these employ-
ers to switch to electronic payroll distribution. At the 
same time, Rath and others emphasized that com-
municating the advantages of electronic payment of 
payroll and other sources of revenue is certainly an op-
portunity for financial educators and the government. 
Moreover, such educational programs should not be 
limited to consumers; they should also be relevant to 
small businesses. 
  As part of this discussion, Rath used the ex-
ample of unemployment insurance to raise another 
important consideration related to incentives. For 
unemployment insurance, the distribution of federal 
funds is administered by individual states, with the 
Department of Labor reimbursing all administrative 
expenses incurred by the states. As a result, state ad-
ministrative offices are less motivated by the potential 
cost-savings typically associated with converting from 
a paper-based to an electronic distribution process. 
Instead, state administrative offices must be made to 
consider other benefits gained through electronic pay-
ment of these funds, such as the efficiencies electronic 
payments offer for customers during a disaster.37 All too 
often, Rath noted, these factors are insufficient to alter 
behavior. In response, several participants emphasized 
that continued migration toward electronic payment 
of government disbursements may require a legislative 
change in order to align incentives. Ron Congemi, 
of First Data Corporation, captured the sentiment of 
many participants in this discussion when he suggested 
that, ultimately, electronification of government dis-
bursements will require not only private-sector efforts 
but also leadership from both the executive and con-
37 Mange described many of these efficiencies earlier in the discus-
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gressional branches of the federal government. 
  Indeed, since the Payment Cards Center con-
ference was held in early May, several developments 
in this regard have taken place, including two separate 
requests for information issued by the Department 
of Health and Human Services, both of which were 
motivated by recommendations detailed in a report 
called The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Les-
sons Learned.38 The first request for information relates 
to Voluntary Storage of Personal Data in Preparation for 
Emergencies and asks for comment on the feasibility 
of “private sector services through which individuals 
could voluntarily submit their personal information 
for storage so that they, their family members, or other 
designated individuals could access the information in 
an emergency.” The second request, Development and 
Implementation of Electronic Benefits Transfer System for 
Victims of Disaster to Receive Federal and State Benefits, 
calls for consideration of “establishing a system of Elec-
tronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) as a simple, comprehen-
sive, and efficient means to deliver to disaster victims 
the Federal, State, and local human services for which 
they qualify.” In addition, on June 1, 2006, the Feder-
al Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) 
member agencies and the Conference of State Bank 
Supervisors jointly produced a booklet39 that listed les-
sons that financial institutions learned in the aftermath 
of Hurricane Katrina. This booklet is intended to serve 
as a reference for institutions to use in their contin-
gency planning.    
 
IV. Conclusion
  While events like Hurricane Katrina may re-
sult in overwhelming destruction and have significant 
consequences for victims, they also represent an op-
portunity to reexamine the readiness of participants in 
our payment system. The broad representation from all 
levels of government and from across the financial ser-
vices and payment industries at this conference dem-
onstrates the commitment of these participants and 
their organizations to applying the lessons learned from 
Hurricane Katrina to strengthen both contingency and 
disaster-response planning.  
  Conference participants translated the experi-
ences discussed during the conference sessions into 
steps that can be taken in both the short and long term 
to continue to strengthen the resiliency of our financial 
system. These recommendations included developing 
strategies for more government payments to be made 
electronically, consolidating and sharing data on disas-
ter victims more broadly with relief agencies and pay-
ment providers, focusing local communities and state 
governments on developing contingency plans for pay-
ment continuity, and improving public- and private-
sector coordination among entities that play key roles 
in the payment system. 
38 The full report can be found at www.whitehouse.gov/reports/ 
katrina-lessons-learned/.
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The Payment Cards Center was established to serve as a source of knowledge and expertise on consumer credit and payments; 
this includes the study of credit cards, debit cards, prepaid cards, smart cards, and similar payment vehicles.  Consumers’ 
and businesses’ evolving use of electronic payments to effect transactions in the economy has potential implications for 
the structure of the financial system, for the way that monetary policy affects the economy, and for the efficiency of the 
payments system.